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Signs of the Times: 
Emblems of Baroque Science Fiction
Bradley J. Nelson
Semantic Faculties: Factions within the mathic world, in the years following the 
Reconstitution, generally claiming descent from Halikaarn. So named because 
they believed that symbols could bear actual semantic content. The idea is 
traceable to Protas and to Hylea before him. Compare Syntactic Faculties. 
(THE DICTIONARY, 4th edition,  A. R. 3000)1
In his 2002 tour de force essay on the Hispanic baroque Barroco, Fernando R. 
de la Flor introduces Juan de Borja’s emblem, Hominem te esse cogita (think 
that you are [only] a man), as evidence of a Hispanic counter-proposal to the 
Cartesian revolution, signaled by Descartes’s emblematic motto Cogito ergo 
sum (Fig. 1). The Spanish scholar’s lengthy dissertation on Spain’s contesta-
tory relationship with European modernity deploys Borja’s emblem as a pro-
lepsis for his hypothesis concerning a specifically Hispanic strategy for negoti-
ating the modern marriage of (proto-)capitalism and political absolutism. The 
essay goes to great lengths to excavate what the author identifies as the subver-
sive nihilism at the heart of Counter-Reformation efforts to close off the Span-
ish empire from the progressive and instrumentalist thrust behind Descartes’s 
attempt to define and legitimize the individual subject’s encounter with, and 
analysis of, the real physical causes of the universe. 
R. de la Flor’s argument is dialectically anchored in his rejection of José 
Antonio Maravall’s more instrumentalist (Cartesian) definition of the Spanish 
baroque: “I believe that the peculiarity of this hispanic baroque culture resides, 
precisely, in what Maravall denies from the beginning: that is, in the manifest 
capacity of its expressive system to move in the opposite direction to any es-
tablished ends” (Barroco 19).
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R. de la Flor’s face-to-the-wind navigation of Spanish mysticism and skep-
tical philosophy frames its anti-Cartesian characterization of the Spanish ba-
roque within Borja’s emblem of desengaño:
[Borja] manages to give a precise body to a Counter-Reformation ethos, profoundly 
contrary to what is revealed to be the growing substance and process of self-suf-
ficient individuation, attached to the expansive logic of capitalism. An axiom, of 
course, which we could certainly not call foundational, rather, to the contrary, pro-
foundly delegitimizing, since above all it introduces the concept of contingency 
and decay, that which is precisely opposed to what, I’ll say it once more, the proud 
Cartesian cogito and the sum and the e[r]go erect. (Barroco 50)
According to this stance, the quixotic yet still modern drive of the Spanish 
baroque is produced in the very effort to seal Spain off from modernity in order 
to override internal material and social decay through the erection of what R. 
de la Flor calls, in another place, the “metaphysical peninsula.”2 In essence, the 
insistent and cruel ironization of the real reduces social and political hierarchies 
Fig. 1. Hominem Te Esse Cogita, in Juan de Borja, Empresas morales (1680), (198–99)
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to dust and thus open to derision. These “anarchical” tendencies of Hispanic 
baroque nihilism are seen to offer a perverse reflection of Cartesian scientific 
rationalism: where Descartes’s indicative cogito rejects the neoscholastic de-
substantialization of the human subject, Borja’s imperative cogita reduces all 
hierarchical structures, including Reason, to the same nothingness at the heart 
of the confessional subject, thus preparing the ground for the liberating drive 
of modernity. In scientific terms, the gradual displacement of neoscholastic 
dogma concerning physical causality by “hypothetical” mathematical theo-
rems results in a nihilistic relativism, especially where political necessity is 
concerned.
There are several problems with this characterization of the Spanish ba-
roque, the most intractable of which arises from what has become a common-
place: the oft-lamented and/or celebrated difference as regards Spain’s rela-
tionship to Europe. Another arises from a similarly categorical understanding 
of Descartes’s place in modernity. As Lyle Massey points out, Descartes’s at-
tempts to legitimize an empirical approach to the central questions of natural 
philosophy are plagued by the same Augustinian interdictions concerning the 
finitude and fallibility of human faculties and bodies that R. de la Flor asso-
ciates with an exclusively Counter-Reformation understanding of human (un)
reason. In this light, Descartes’s attempt to plot a mathematical way out of the 
vacuum that begins to surround traditional Neoscholastic notions of physical 
causality is no more or less modern than attempts by political and social elites, 
in baroque Spain, to respond to an analogous power vacuum that accompanies 
the erosion of traditional doctrines concerning blood-based social hierarchies. 
Seemingly overlooked by R. de la Flor is the fact that Maravall’s notion of 
“baroque guided culture” as a reactionary social mentality is dependent on the 
nihilistic potential—and concomitant melancholy, or terror—of this epochal 
change (Culture of the Baroque).
The struggle between an unbounded—in theory at least—will to knowl-
edge and institutional attempts to control the scientist’s curious desire can be 
approached from a number of perspectives. But the point of departure and cen-
tral trope of this essay will be “the emblematic mode of representation” (Daly). 
My thesis is that the emblem and the images of knowledge that it configures 
function as a middle space or medium for the negotiation of a residual desire to 
identify a unified meaning in the cosmos, on the one hand, and a fragmented, 
hybrid, and contradictory search for knowledge symptomatic of the modern 
world, on the other. In opposition to a nihilistic reading of Borja’s emblem, 
Hominem te esse cogita, my reading of this emblem—and the two I will inter-
pret toward the end of this essay—will focus on how Borja’s desire to rein in 
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the desiring intellect can be seen as a conservative reaction to a modern intel-
lectual program initiated within his own religious order, the Society of Jesus. 
More to the point, what is arguably culturally specific about Borja’s emblem—
although this is debatable as well—is the relationship between the desire for 
knowledge and the guilt produced by institutional attempts to lead the subject 
to reject his own desiring intellect. In the end, what is most evident in the em-
blem is not the actual existence of epochal change but rather the fear of change 
as it is represented in a literary expression emanating from one of the most 
powerful families in Europe. For this reason, I will take up R. de la Flor’s link-
ing of emblematics to science in a very literal sense. 
Although he never produced an emblem book, no texts are more emblem-
atic of the baroque, courtly subject of representation than Baltasar Gracián’s. 
Alciato’s emblems appear sixteen times in Agudeza y arte de ingenio; more-
over, in Gracián’s assemblage of a genealogy of writers of “philosophical 
truths,” emblematics is situated at the center of the curious relationship be-
tween baroque science and aesthetics.3
A un mismo blanco de la filosófica verdad, asestaron todos los sabios, aunque por 
diferentes rumbos de la invención y agudeza. Homero con sus Epopeyas, Esopo 
con sus Fábulas, Séneca con sus Sentencias, Ovidio con sus Metamorfosis, Juvenal 
con sus Sátiras, Alciato con sus Emblemas, Erasmo con sus Refranes, el Bocalino 
con sus Alegorías y el príncipe don Juan Manuel con sus Cuentos. La semejanza 
es el fundamento de toda la invención fingida, y la traslación de lo mentido a lo 
verdadero es el alma de esta agudeza. (Gracián 425)
(All wise men took aim at the same target of philosophical truth, although by dif-
ferent paths of invention and wit. Homer with his Epics, Aesop with his Fables, 
Seneca with his Sentences, Ovid with his Metamorphosis, Juvenal with his Satires, 
Alciato with his Emblems, Erasmus with his Adages, Bocalino with his Allegories 
and the prince Don Juan Manuel with his Stories. Semblance is the foundation of 
all feigned invention, and the translation of falseness into truth is the soul of this 
wit.) 4
One of the most interesting aspects of this philosophical canon is the asser-
tive way in which aesthetics and philosophy are held to be inextricably related, 
an early modern commonplace that is often overlooked by modern critics, who 
tend to bracket off literary creation from more “scientific” fields of practice. 
However, as Thomas Kuhn argues in his study of the Copernican revolution, 
“the real appeal of sun-centered astronomy was aesthetic rather than pragmatic. 
To astronomers the initial choice between Copernicus’ system and Ptolemy’s 
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could only be a matter of taste, and matters of taste are the most difficult of 
all to define or debate” (172). What unites Gracián’s authors is the indirect or 
oblique manner in which they assemble and communicate their philosophical 
truths. All discourse falls under the rubric of what he terms ficciones in some 
places and mentiras in others, as aesthetic-philosophical practice becomes situ-
ated at the center of “a system of moral and epistemological rigor. . . . Truth, 
in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, 
which in time seems to owe even its existence to the [literary subject]” (Said 
67). Due to the self-conscious way in which they foreground their representa-
tional status, these allegorical genres both display and problematize the unsta-
ble and tenuous relationship between language, history, truth, and subjectivity. 
In Massey’s words, “it is in the moment when skeptical doubt is strongest and 
most overwhelming that a glimpse of the truth or certainty of being is possible” 
(1163). Gracián foregrounds the fundamental cut between the desire for episte-
mological certitudes emanating from what R. de la Flor terms a medievalizing 
“organicist” ontology, based on Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance and form, 
and the “fallacious” nature of man’s epistemological faculties and instruments. 
If science, whether practiced by Aristotelian natural philosophers or Coperni-
can astronomers, must rely on an inescapably fictitious terrestrial syntax, then 
what we find in Gracián’s philosophical canon is the problematic and tension-
filled space of science fiction.
Much can be learned about baroque representations of truth and the cos-
mos by relating early modern debates between mathematical astronomers and 
natural philosophers to the popular postmodern genre of science fiction: or as 
Neal Stephenson dubs it, “speculative fiction” (“Note” xiii). Science fiction 
deals primarily with hypothetical realities derived from theoretical specula-
tion and technological projections, often based on actual scientific discoveries, 
which makes it an ideal sounding board for the complicated relation between 
science, fiction, and natural philosophy in early modernity. For example, Ste-
phenson’s Snow Crash (1992) is a sci-fi thriller whose most exciting action, 
both theoretical and “physical,” takes place in the virtual space of the World 
Wide Web; and his bestseller Cryptonomicon (1999) is a mindbender that 
spans the years between WWII and the end of the twenty-first century, and 
whose plot is embedded in a complex history and performance of cryptogra-
phy. In both novels, narrative space and storyline developments are formulated 
as binary mathematical duels and geometrical witticisms that have a direct 
bearing on the immediate or real circumstances of their metafictional worlds. 
Stephenson is probably best known for his trilogy The Baroque Cycle (2003–
2004), which weaves a vast and compelling narrative from the philosophical, 
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scientific, economic, and political currents that drive the West’s transition to 
modernity. Whether set in the past or the future, what sets Stephenson’s fiction 
apart are his approachable and witty explanations and performances of com-
plex theoretical concepts and conundrums, such as the ingenious parallels he 
draws between Leibniz’s invention of “the calculus” and major advances made 
in cryptography in the seventeenth century (The System of the World).
His latest work of speculative fiction Anathem (2008), whose emblematic 
name combines the seemingly antithetical notions of anthem and anathema, 
takes place on the fictional world of “Arbre,” and appears to be set simultane-
ously several millennia in the future and the past. Anathem’s narrator and pro-
tagonist is named Fraa Erasmas, and the action follows his movement between 
the two main social and political spaces on Arbre (a clever and theoretically 
plausible ramification of Earth). In one space we find the “mathic universe,” 
which is made up of diverse, enclosed monastic orders of “avouts,” each with 
its own theoretical or dogmatic identity—think aristotelians, neoplatonists, car-
tesians, etc. On the other side of the wall, literally, is the “extramuros world,” 
which sports the technologically based, sensory overload of our own postmod-
ern cosmopolis, and whose leaders, although they draw on the expertise and 
advice of high ranking members of the maths, wield the real power on Arbre 
and are referred to as the “saeculars.” At several points in Arbre’s violent his-
tory, the extramuros populations have succumbed to their fear of the avouts’ 
ability to translate their theoretical discoveries into various forms of alternately 
amazing and terrifying praxis. This saecular fear of the avout has resulted in 
the separation and isolation of the latter in the aforementioned maths, as well 
as a strict prohibition on almost all forms of praxis (enforced by The Inquisi-
tion), especially any new ones that could give the mathic world power over the 
Saeculum. There are, in other words, at least two alien “races” already occupy-
ing parallel universes in the Arborean microcosm. 
Anathem’s rather conventional plot is triggered by an astounding as-
tronomical phenomenon: a massive spacecraft has been spotted orbiting the 
planet, and its discovery turns Arbre’s society on its head, forcing the mathic 
and extramuros populations to work together to confront a possible common 
threat.5 This is where the conventional part ends and Stephenson’s particular 
genius for explaining and dramatizing ontological and epistemological co-
nundrums begins to pull the phenomenological rug out from underneath his 
readers. For although the spacecraft displays a number of images (i.e., platonic 
forms) that are recognizable to avout and educated saeculars alike—such as 
triangles, circles, and, most importantly, a geometrical proof [Fig. 2]—Ste-
phenson does not allow the reader to completely anthropomorphize the alien 
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“Geometers,” a strategy which also effects a useful dehumanization of the Ar-
boreans, lest we be lulled into forgetting that they also come from another time 
and space.6
The discovery that the aliens may deploy the same geometrical language 
as the Arboreans is the occasion for Stephenson to introduce a number of 
speculative thought experiments, which the avout use to explain the theoretical 
problems that arise from attempting to understand an alien linguistic system. 
One example features platonic models of a fly (all eyes), a bat (all ears), and 
a worm (all touch), and asks how three beings that rely on mutually exclusive 
perception faculties and linguistic systems might work together to solve a com-
mon problem. (We are not so far removed from the Augustinian denigration of 
the human senses that lies at the foundation of Counter-Reformation ontology 
Fig. 2. Pythagorean theorem. (Courtesy Cilpart FCIT.)
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and the nihilistic epistemology described by R. de la Flor.) The Geometers, it 
turns out, come from four different planets, each of whose evolutionary history 
has produced a type of matter that is literally impossible on any of the others, 
including Arbre. Each race is more different in nature from the others than is, 
say, a fly from a bat or a worm, all of which are carbon-based life forms and 
share fundamental molecular material. The theoretical problems produced by 
this situation are as numerous as they are profound, in that the same sensory 
faculties that allow a race to navigate and manipulate its reality turn out to be 
serious obstacles in encounters with competing realities: unless, of course, they 
can find a common syntax through which to communicate, such as geometry.
The plot line most germane to this essay concerns the decoding of the em-
blem engraved on the side of the ship, the aforementioned geometric proof, 
which introduces the opposed, linguistic orders mentioned in the epigraph at 
the beginning of this essay: the Syntacticians and the Semanticists. For the 
Syntactician, the emblematic riddle presents a series of challenges, the fore-
most of which is deciding which unique syntax, out of all imaginable syntaxes, 
might help identify the Geometers’ intended meaning. This is complicated by 
the fact that each of the four races of Geometers communicates according to a 
different material and linguistic matrix. Since language is both made possible 
and absolutely limited by biological and chemical mechanisms embedded in 
corporeal matter, incompatible material matrices result in incompatible syntac-
tic faculties. For the Semanticist, the problem may appear less difficult, since 
each linguistic sign harbors, a priori, a meaning unique to itself. The problem 
here would be to identify which of the inherited, or iconic, meanings the Ge-
ometers are deploying and whether this meaning would be unique to one of the 
four cosmologies, or common to all.
In Thomist terms, all of this speculation concerning the authorial intent of 
the Geometers is performed ex suppositione, or from effects to causes, which 
carries the potential of producing an infinite number of causal explanations in 
which the Geometers’ arrival “makes sense.” By bringing these competing cos-
mologies to bear on the scant physical evidence produced by the starry mes-
sengers,7 Stephenson fashions a baroque space in which there are no stable 
foundations or boundaries, only increasingly complex folds of mathematical, 
philosophical, and religious matrices revolving around what is taken for a geo-
metrical emblem, but which functions, in the end, as a limit or void; a veritable 
vacuum where reality and meaning are concerned.8 Rather than stabilize the 
reality of the interstellar encounter, the emblem on the side of the ship func-
tions as a medium in which distinct linguistic, scientific, and ideological orders 
are negotiated and questioned: in other words, a space where definitions and 
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speculation concerning the self and the other are brought into contact and con-
flict. Much like Borja’s emblem of the skull, the meaning of the Geometers’ 
trademark is never satisfactorily established. Indeed, although Anathem’s plot 
ends with a conventional romantic liaison, the reader is left with the impression 
that this is only one of a large if not infinite number of actual, coexisting end-
ings, all but one of which is absent. This last one, in which “boy gets girl,” also 
happens to be the one most desired by the reader. Other endings suggested by 
the text include: the death of all the main characters and the destruction of Ar-
bre; or the death of all the main characters and the destruction of the spaceship. 
There are, in other words, a significant number of simultaneously hypothetical 
and real universes produced by the syntactic arrangement of the semantic pos-
sibilities of the novel, reflected, once again, in the title of the book: Anathem.
We find an analogous situation in the baroque, where emblems serve as a 
theoretical space and strategic praxis for the negotiation of power and meaning 
in virtually every literary practice of early modernity.9 Emblem scholars such 
as Daly, Russell, and R. de la Flor (Emblemas) have established the emblem’s 
central role in the baroque culture of spectacle, but I would like to use Stephen-
son’s speculative model as a guide for analyzing emblematics as a medium for 
the negotiation and problematization of dominant and emergent scientific para-
digms of early modern Europe. We begin with the observation that the most 
important astronomical discovery of the seventeenth century is framed not as 
a scientific achievement but instead takes the form of an emblem, in which the 
discoverer Galileo exploits his discovery of the four moons of Jupiter (1609) in 
the celebration of the celestial legitimacy of the political dynasty of Cosimo II 
de Medici. Mario Biagioli writes: 
What he had observed, Galileo claimed, was not a discovery but a confirmation of 
the Medici’s destiny, almost a scientific proof of their dynastic horoscope. . . . It 
was not by chance that the “bright stars offer[ed] themselves in the heavens” right 
after Cosimo II’s enthronement. It was not by chance that such stars were circling 
around Jupiter (Cosimo’s planet) like his offspring and that Jupiter was actually 
above the horizon at the time of Prince Cosimo’s birth, thus passing on to him the 
virtues of the founder of the dynasty. (128)
Scientific achievement and emblematic wit are wedded in Galileo’s device, 
and rather than framing the mathematical rigor of his method or the astronomi-
cal implications of such a discovery, the Medicean stars symbolize a politi-
cal end: the destiny of the Medici dynasty. Nor is this Galileo’s first attempt 
at emblematizing a scientific phenomenon in politico-mythological terms. It 
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was, in fact, an emblem he assembled on the occasion of Cosimo’s wedding 
(to Maria Maddalena of Austria), that paved the way for his self-transforma-
tion from a university mathematician into the preeminent court philosopher in 
Italy. On that occasion, he composed an emblem based on the image of a lode-
stone, “identifying in the sympathetic attraction between the lodestone and the 
small pieces of iron a fine metaphor for the Medici political agenda” (Biagioli 
121). Far from an exception to the rule, Galileo’s Medicean stars tell us much 
about the interpenetration of mathematical astronomy and more courtly social 
practices in the baroque. In order to understand why and how emblematics be-
comes such an important key to the struggle for legitimacy of mathematical as-
tronomy (and heliocentric cosmology), it is necessary to take a more compre-
hensive look at the hierarchies internal to early modern intellectual institutions: 
specifically, the relationship between the alien paradigms of mathematically 
based astronomy and neoaristotelian natural philosophy.
 Let us recall that Copernicus wrote his famous treatise advocating the 
shift to a heliocentric conception of the universe in 1543. Sixty-five years later, 
Copernican astronomy has still not become the dominant cosmological model, 
even though its mathematical innovations made a significant impact on both 
the calculation of the movement of the planets and related efforts to reform the 
calendar. As Kuhn explains, “Using Copernicus’ mathematical system without 
advocating the physical motion of the earth provided a convenient escape from 
the dilemma posed by the contrasting celestial harmonies and terrestrial dis-
cord of the De Revolutionibus” (187). The reasons for this seeming contradic-
tion are numerous and stem from technical problems internal to Copernicus’s 
mathematical models, as well as from external resistance emanating from phil-
osophical, theological, and sociopolitical traditions. As previously mentioned, 
Galileo’s Sidereus Nuncius demonstrates how any boundaries between these 
domains cannot be maintained without serious bracketing operations com-
ing into play. In the words of Biagioli, “patronage is the key to understanding 
processes of identity and status formation that are the keys to understanding 
both the scientists’ cognitive attitudes and career strategies” (14). His land-
mark study Galileo, Courtier convincingly demonstrates that the conversion of 
mathematical realism into the dominant scientific paradigm of modernity is, in 
the main, a question of social prestige and intellectual legitimacy, rather than a 
case of an empirically-based science triumphing over myth. Although Galileo’s 
astronomical discoveries would not have been possible without his training and 
expertise in mathematics and optics, it was thanks to his artistry and wit as an 
emblematist that his discoveries became spectacular marvels in the Court, thus 
launching him into his new identity as court philosopher. 
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The main challenge facing the inventor of the telescope, one which he 
never completely overcame, was the low scientific and social status given to 
mathematics and astronomy in Scholastic and Neoscholastic thought and ac-
ademic institutions. Analogous to the artisan status of medieval painters and 
sculptors, mathematicians and astronomers were considered mere technicians 
who dealt with abstract, hypothetical, syntactic devices—“syn-dev” in Ste-
phenson’s vocabulary—unlike natural philosophers, who dealt with the real 
necessary causes and meanings of cosmological phenomena. According to 
Rivka Feldhay’s analysis of the Jesuits’ attempts to legitimize mathematics as 
a necessary part of natural philosophy, “astronomical theories had the status 
of probable, hypothetical truths . . . but could not become the basis of a new 
cosmological vision” (206). Although mathematical calculation was useful and 
necessary to the practical problems of mechanics, navigation, and optics—as 
well as military installations, weaponry, and strategizing—mathematical forms, 
signs, and syntax were considered hypothetical rather than real. Furthermore, 
since mathematical proofs proceed from effects to causes (ex suppositione) 
rather than from universal causes to material effects, “mathematics could never 
secure the absolute necessity of a physical cause” (Feldhay 206). According to 
Gracián’s view, its philosophical truths were communicated through fictional 
means.
In this light, one of the most surprising alliances of the Counter-Refor-
mation was that between Galileo and Jesuit mathematicians and scholars at 
the Collegio Romano. A. C. Crombie and A. Carugo have demonstrated that 
“two autograph treatises on natural philosophy which [Galileo] published as 
juvenalia were based on textbooks, sometimes copied word for word, by three 
well-known Jesuit philosophers at the Collegio Romano” (167). Biagioli notes 
that, “without being Copernicans, the Jesuits eventually gave a very strong 
endorsement of Galileo’s telescopic observations” (93). This relationship be-
comes less of a mystery once we recognize that the Jesuits, behind the forceful 
writings of Christopher Clavius, initiated an ingenious program to legitimize 
mathematics as both necessary and useful to the search for absolute causes 
at the heart of Thomist natural philosophy. As detailed above, the motivations 
for this tentative and incomplete rapprochement were as social and political in 
nature as they were philosophical and theological. But the kernel of discord in 
this modern struggle—essentially between the Dominicans and the Jesuits—is 
emblematic of the shift from the essentializing dogmas of Scholastic theology, 
wedded to the Ptolemaic cosmological system, toward the decentered scientific 
realism of the Copernican revolution.
At once theological and scientific, ontological and epistemological, the 
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main bone of contention at the heart of Neoscholastic thought, according to 
Feldhay, is man’s free will: specifically, what God knows absolutely and/or hy-
pothetically about man’s future actions. Contrary to what is generally presup-
posed, “the Counter-Reformation gave birth to two different Thomist interpre-
tations embedded in different institutional settings, with different problems and 
goals, different ideological frameworks, and different attitudes to knowledge” 
(Feldhay 197). In modern (fictional) scientific terms, we are looking at two 
distinct, if simultaneous, “Causal Domain[s]: A collection of things mutually 
linked in a web of cause-and-effect relationships—THE DICTIONARY, 4th 
edition, A.R. 3000” (Stephenson, Anathem 788). The “pure” Thomists were 
the Dominicans, who believed that God’s foreknowledge of man’s actions is 
absolute, because God’s knowledge and will must remain inseparable if his 
omnipotence is to remain absolute: “The necessity of predestination derives 
from the absolute character of God’s foreknowledge and will. Only by em-
phasizing the absolute necessity of predestination can God’s omnipotence be 
satisfactorily vindicated” (Feldhay 205). Moreover, since knowledge and will 
only become knowable in God’s willed decree, these three aspects constitute a 
closed triangle of simultaneous, atemporal acts, a formal structure that removes 
God’s knowledge and actions from any temporal or spatial sense of progres-
sion. There is no room for hypothetical knowledge, which would arise only if 
there were to appear a space of indetermination, temporal in nature, between 
divine knowledge and the exercise of divine will, which would then resituate 
God’s decree within a temporal framework and, in this way, allow for hypo-
thetical knowledge. 
This, however, is exactly what Clavius attempts to do by resituating God’s 
knowledge and will according to a temporal relationship in which the exercise 
of his will in the realization of a divine decree is postponed, similar to the way 
a deus ex machina decrees the meaning and status of a dramatic representa-
tion after the action has come to a halt. Until such time as the decree is willed, 
God’s foreknowledge remains hypothetical: “Separate and prior to the decree, 
the Jesuits contended, God has ‘scientia media’ by which he knows with a 
certain and infallible knowledge man’s future acts, although these are not yet 
predestined by his will. To some degree, God’s voluntary decree is guided by 
his knowledge” (Felday 205). There is, of course, an irresolvable contradiction 
here, since if God’s knowledge is infallible there is no logical reason for him 
to delay the exercise of his will and the pronouncement of his decree. Never-
theless, it is no more problematic than the Dominican concept of man’s pre-
destined free will. More importantly, it opens up a space for God’s knowledge 
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itself to become hypothetical in nature, which allows for the legitimation of 
hypothetical fields of human knowledge, such as mathematics.
The problem for Copernicus, Galileo, and now Clavius is that Thomism 
“appeared to have doubts about the real essence of mathematical entities (geo-
metrical circles, for example), and probably accepted the opinion that they 
differed essentially from physical entities (material bodies in the form of a 
sphere)” (Feldhay 206). In other words, it is as much a question of ontology as 
epistemology; or, perhaps better stated, ontology and epistemology are welded 
together by the doctrine of free will, whichever doctrine one happens to as-
cribe to. As Robert Westman writes, “Copernicus has made a physical claim 
and . . . this claim has violated accepted divisions of knowledge” (108). Since 
astronomical theories were dependent on these hypothetical, mathematical en-
tities to express their theses and proofs concerning the calculation, measure-
ment, and causes of the movement of celestial bodies, “[they] had the status of 
probable, hypothetical truths” (Feldhay 207). In institutional terms, this doc-
trine produced a de facto intellectual hierarchy that placed mathematicians in a 
socially and intellectually subordinate position. Westman has determined that 
mathematics professors earned about one-fifth the salary of professors of more 
prestigious disciplines, such as philosophy and medicine. Moreover, “at none 
of these institutions was there provision for the doctorate in mathematics or 
astronomy, no licensing, that is, which recognized that symbol of full disci-
plinary autonomy” (117). It is for this reason that the Jesuits’ prolonged effort 
to raise the profile and legitimacy of mathematics moves in two directions at 
once.
From the theologico-philosophical point of view, Clavius, professor of 
mathematics at the Collegio Romano from 1564 to 1612, assembles an inno-
vative defense of mathematics by performing a dialectical turn on Thomism’s 
attempts to yoke it to the concept of a “middle, or mixed, science”: “It was 
Aquinas who developed the concept of the ‘mixed science,’ which implied 
the denial of any methodological autonomy to sciences applying mathemati-
cal methods to physical principles (optics, mechanics, and music were also in-
cluded in this group)” (Feldhay 206). Clavius turns this relation around by em-
phasizing the mediatory and necessary position and function of mathematics 
where the study of real physical objects and the analysis and communication of 
their causes and effects are concerned, since the latter cannot be properly ana-
lyzed and understood without the logical syntaxes of mathematics and geome-
try. Crombie and Carugo note that this posture is neoplatonic in nature: “Math-
ematics was necessary to natural philosophy because it was concerned with 
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‘middle essence’ lying between the ‘sensible essence’ of things and the purely 
‘intelligible essence’ of the divine” (195). In Clavius’s own words: “[The 
mathematical sciences] are concerned with things that can be considered apart 
from sensible matter, although they themselves are immersed in matter, thus 
being like both metaphysics and physics, each of which shares one of these 
modes of consideration” (qtd. in Feldhay 207). In this way, he is able to desta-
bilize the rigid dichotomy between the hypothetical and the real, the sensible 
and the intelligible, and the probable and the necessary. Clavius’s next move 
extends his critique of these dichotomies to the marriage between ontological 
and epistemological necessity. Since mathematics can be considered separate 
from “sensible matter” according to its designation as a middle or mixed sci-
ence, true and real knowledge can also be separated from real objects: “There 
is true knowledge of mathematical entities, whose ontological status is now 
redefined as a hybrid between the hypothetical and the real. This special inter-
mediate status constitutes them as a nexus between the rational structure of the 
mind and the real structure of the physical world” (Feldhay 208). By making 
this cut between being and knowledge, Clavius is able to argue that epistemo-
logical necessity may be established in the relationship between hypothetical 
knowledge and observed effects, although “this necessity is not guaranteed by 
an (ontological) necessity of the relation between causes and effects” (Feldhay 
210). Scientific knowledge, thus, functions in the same way that “God’s knowl-
edge of the future acts of men was considered true knowledge of hypothetical 
objects, neither speculative nor practical—infallible, but not entailing ontologi-
cal necessity” (Feldhay 207). Although the Jesuits do not ascribe to Coperni-
cus’s neoplatonic elevation of mathematical and geometrical forms to the plane 
of intelligible reality, one can see an affinity between Clavius’s statement and 
Galileo’s assertion that “the book of philosophy is that which stands perpetu-
ally open before our eyes, but because it is written in characters different from 
those of our alphabet it cannot be read by everybody; and the characters of this 
book are triangles, squares, circles, spheres, cones, pyramids and other math-
ematical figures fittest for this sort of reading” (qtd. in Crombie and Carugo 
217).
According to the Dominicans’ orthodox stance, Galileo’s statement is un-
tenable due to the aforementioned problems that arise when working from ef-
fects to causes (ex suppositione). Since mathematical and geometrical figures 
and symbols carry no stable, i.e., necessary, semantic content, relying on them 
in the establishment of causes creates the potential for multiple, even contra-
dictory, cosmological truths. As Andrea Battistini points out, the possibility of 
what Stephenson calls the “polycosmic universe” carries serious ontological 
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and epistemological consequences: “Human minds were upset by the melan-
cholic sensation that the Earth was deprived of its ancient centrality, lost in the 
infinite spaces that lacked secure points of reference as there no longer existed 
anything motionless in the universe” (22).
Fig. 3. O Quarto Dia, in Francisco de Holanda, De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines (1545?), 
folio 6r
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If the Earth is just another planet orbiting the Sun, then it is but one of an 
infinite number of centers, which brings us close to Stephenson’s speculative 
experiments with multiple causal domains.10 It is precisely this type of insta-
bility, or freedom, that Galileo proposed when he began the process of self-
transformation from university mathematician to court philosopher. 
The subsequent history of the Jesuits tells us that, in political terms at 
least, their ingenious attempts to rewrite the Thomist doctrine of free will, as 
well as the philosophical program concerning hypothetical versus physical 
knowledge, were ultimately suppressed. Nevertheless, the drive to alter the hi-
erarchical relation between mathematics and natural philosophy bore real fruit, 
in spite of the 1616 condemnation of Copernican astronomy and the censure of 
its most famous and accomplished proponent. Once again, the parallel move-
ment of Galileo’s career as courtly philosopher and Clavius’s assertion of the 
legitimacy of mathematical-scientific knowledge provides a productive coun-
terpoint. In opposition to the way in which philosophical disputations were 
traditionally organized in the university, Clavius argues that mathematics pro-
fessors ought to be able to participate in these academic events. Following up 
on Westman’s earlier comments, the Jesuits are in fact instrumental in creating 
many of the first mathematics professorships in Europe. That being said, it is 
ultimately in the absolutist court where mathematics first achieves the status 
desired by Clavius, through marvelous marriages of courtly spectacle and sci-
entific achievements designed by figures like Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Jo-
hannes Kepler. In the words of Biagioli, “in the same way artisans had become 
artists by representing the prince’s mythologies of power in painting, sculpture, 
and architecture, Galileo turned himself into a philosopher by representing the 
satellites of Jupiter as Medici dynastic emblems” (156). Thus, even though the 
philosophical and scientific arguments and achievements would seem to be the 
substance of the transition to modern scientific realism, the material vehicle for 
this transition is the allegorical and iconological medium of the emblem. And 
although the emblem proved useful and effective for Galileo, its allegorical and 
philological machinery is not wedded to any one philosophical or ideological 
current of thought or institution in the baroque, especially in Spain. Like the 
geometrical figures it so often deploys for allegorical ends, its syntax carries no 
inherent semantic or ideological substance.
To this point, I have probably given the impression that the Jesuits were a 
progressive force in Counter-Reformation thought; and, by comparison with 
the Dominicans, they were, at least where scientific education is concerned. 
And it is in Jesuit emblematics, specifically the Hispanic emblem pioneered 
by Juan de Borja, where we once again find an alliance between scientific im-
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ages and a Jesuit-inspired educational program.11 Credited with the invention 
of the “empresa hispánica,” Borja is the first Spanish author to write an original 
emblem book, and the changes he initiates in the genre are substantial enough 
to warrant his placement at the vanguard of Spanish emblematics.12 It is note-
worthy that during the years he was probably working on the book Borja is 
known to have brought into his diplomatic and social circles figures such as 
Francisco de Holanda, the painter and draftsman who composed the unpub-
lished De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines, and Luis Jorge Barbuda, a well-known 
cartographer and draftsman. The influence of both letrados can be found in 
Borja’s predilection for mathematical and geometrical images and metaphors.13
Francisco de Holanda was a court painter, architect, and sculptor for King 
John III of Portugal and, later, for the ill-fated Sebastian. Although he finds fa-
vor within the pro-Castilian reign of John III and his widowed daughter-in-law 
Doña Catarina of Hapsburg (sister to Felipe II), Holanda’s dynastic connec-
tions will eventually contribute to his marginalization under the more inde-
pendently minded Sebastian. But it is most likely the vast transformations in 
intellectual and artistic doctrine and practice ushered in by the Counter-Refor-
mation that result in the condemnation of his work to the recondite shadows of 
the Iberian baroque. If we consider Holanda’s first image of The Creation, the 
problems become immediately apparent in light of our previous discussion of 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Thomism: “Starting from a perfect circle, 
three triangles merge in the abyss, provoking a strange sensation as much of 
movement as of immobility. Alpha and Omega are inscribed on the first equi-
lateral triangle, perfectly inscribed in the circle” (Deswarte 12) [Fig. 4].
Holanda represents the intelligible reality of the Holy Trinity through a 
“hypothetical” syntax of geometrical figures. Even though he will insist on 
the contrast between the plane of ideal, incorporeal forms and the “imperfect 
copy in the terrestrial zone,” his visual language betrays its genealogical in-
debtedness to the mixed sciences of Neoplatonism, hermeticism, Christian ca-
bala, and Lulism (Deswarte 22).14 From 1545 to 1547, when Holanda begins 
working on his ambitious project, this is perhaps not so problematical; but his 
work on the cosmological history of the world is interrupted by the religious, 
aesthetic, and social reforms initiated at the Council of Trent. By the time he 
returns to De Aetatibus, Spain and Portugal have been colonized by Counter-
Reformation artistic and philosophical theories and practices, which is where 
Juan de Borja enters the scene.
Borja comes to Portugal in 1570 as Felipe II’s ambassador, with the as-
signment of arranging the forever-postponed marriage of Don Sebastian. 
Deswarte writes: “As the son of Francisco de Borja, he is particularly well re-
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ceived by the queen, who is very dedicated to his father [eventually canonized 
as San Francisco] who was her valet in his youth in Tordesillas and whose 
spiritual influence, since he was a Jesuit priest and general of the Society since 
1565, had grown during his various sojourns in Portugal” (64). Borja, who will 
eventually publish the Empresas morales in Prague in 1581, meets Holanda 
and apparently counsels him on how to alter De Aetatibus Mundi so that it will 
Fig. 4. O Primeiro Dia da Criacão, Francisco de Holanda, De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines, 
(1545?), folio 3r
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be more attractive to potential patrons and publishers. Without going into de-
tail, Holanda transforms his mystical and geometrical history of the world into 
a series of spiritual meditations more in line with Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises: “It is, in truth, difficult to reconcile it with the spirit of the first im-
ages, that vast cosmogonic and neoplatonic poem” (Deswarte 62). Even though 
the work is never brought to press, Holanda’s influence on Borja’s book of 
emblems is undeniable, although the Empresas morales move in the opposite 
direction to Holanda’s project, as well as to what we have seen with Galileo.
One of the most important aspects of the Empresas morales is the way in 
which Borja redefines his chosen emblematic vehicle, the empresa. According 
to its humanist theorists, the empresa differs from the emblem in that it con-
tains and expresses a future, personal goal, often associated in the Renaissance 
and early baroque with feats of martial or amorous prowess.15 In this light, 
Galileo’s emblem of the Medicean stars is much closer to the Italian impresa 
than to the Spanish emblem. In the words of García Mahíques, “Juan de Borja 
formally composed in the Italian manner, adapting and inventing conceptual 
artifices according to the model provided by empresas, but he eliminated from 
these their particular character—associated with the knight’s intention or the 
praise of his virtues—and makes them applicable to the moral universe” (In-
troducción 45). In essence, Borja converts a heretofore individualistic enter-
prise into what Maravall calls a “program of cultural guidance,” as preexisting 
predispositions for allegorical play are set in motion around a newly articu-
lated reading practice (The Culture 57). Instead of participating in an inge-
nious courtly joust, or penetrating the hieroglyphic sign in search of ideal and 
original knowledge, Borja’s reader is guided toward a hermeneutical practice 
in which all signs point to the impossibility of illumination and transformation 
of the worldly self and, by extension, the world. 
The sixth emblem of the first part of the Empresas is titled In pusillo nemo 
magnus (no one is great in small things). Its body is composed of what appears 
to be a representation of the world, with a cross on top and a tiny dot in the 
middle of the circle so small that it could almost be an ink stain produced in 
the printing of the book. The subscription reads: “Quan pequeño sea todo lo 
que en el Mundo, es tenido, y estimado por grande, se puede bien conocer, si 
se entiende primero, quan pequeño sea el mismo Mundo; el qual, segun los As-
trologos lo pruevan, es como un punto en comparación de la circumferencia de 
la ultima Esfera, y siendo tan pequeño, aunque señoreandole, y governandole 
todo?” (We can see how small everything in the world is, which is esteemed 
and taken for great, if we first understand how small the World actually is; 
which, as the Astrologers prove, is like a small point in comparison with the 
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circumference of the last sphere, and being so small, what in it could be great, 
even mastering and governing it?) (14) [Fig. 5]. 
What appears to be the Earth is actually the entire cosmos, with the Earth 
reduced to a tiny point. The spiritual thrust of the emblem could not be any 
clearer: one should not worry about things as tiny and insignificant as the ter-
restrial world; rather, one should look to the next world. Thus, R. de la Flor is 
correct when he identifies the nihilistic drive of the emblem; on the other hand, 
this negative ontology extends its reach to encompass the desire of the reading 
subject to act in the world, which means that there is no way out of Borja’s 
“desert.”
Fig. 5. In Pusillo, in Juan de Borja, Empresas morales (1680), 1516
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Another emblem shows an elliptical space through which two lines pass 
horizontally: a solid line above, and a line of dots underneath. The inscription 
reads: “Sic instantibus aeternitas” (Thus does eternity depend on individual 
moments), and the commentary clarifies: 
Ninguna cosa es mas de estimar, ni verdaderamente es mas nuestra, que el 
tiempo . . . no el passado, ni el de por venir, sino tan solamente el presente . . . que 
es tan breve, que no se mide, sino con un instante; que es el mas corto espacio, que 
se puede imaginar (porque assi como un punto, que no se puede dividir, por no 
tener partes indivisibles, pero con todo esto de muchos puntos se forman las lineas) 
de la misma manera, aunque un instante no se puede dividir, se deve much estimar, 
pues de infinitos instantes consta la Eternidad. (140) [Fig. 6]
(Nothing is more dear, nor more truly our own, than time . . . not the past, nor the 
future, but rather only the present . . . which is so brief, that it cannot be measured, 
but with an instant; which is the shortest space, that one can imagine (because like 
a point, it cannot be divided, since it has no divisible parts, but even so from many 
points lines are formed) in the same manner, although an instant cannot be divided, 
it should be held dear, as from infinite instants Eternity is composed.)
In both emblems, Borja performs the same dialectical turn with respect 
to neoplatonism and its influence on sixteenth-century mathematics and as-
tronomy that R. de la Flor perceives in the Spanish diplomat’s anticipatory 
transduction of Descartes’s cogito ergo sum. In spite of Clavius’s energetic and 
ingenious attempts to save mathematical realism from the charge of hypotheti-
cal fictions, Borja’s conservative use of astrology and geometry ties the math-
ematical sciences to a program of spiritual introspection that explicitly rejects 
any attempt to find lasting truth and meaning on the terrestrial plane. The re-
duction of mathematics and geometry to terrestrial dust also acts as an inhibi-
tor where the social aspirations of mathematical astronomers are concerned. 
If mathematical science merely serves to underline the impossibility of intel-
lectual insight concerning physical objects and their causes, what aspirations 
can a practitioner of these mundane praxes dare hope to realize? The difference 
with respect to Galileo’s and Copernicus’s assertions to the contrary could not 
be greater.
So, what are we to do with these seemingly contradictory programs for de-
ploying identical mathematical and geometrical syntaxes? Stephenson uses the 
sci-fi term “causal domain shear” to refer to the radical effects that occur when 
two completely distinct universes come together, even if it is only “a single 
photon that manage[s] to travel somehow between them” (Anathem 28). In the 
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case I have just presented, the conflicting cosmologies that result from oppos-
ing syntactical arrangements of mathematico-geometrical figures share much 
more than a single particle of light; they are produced by the same religious 
order, or math. I would argue that in spite of, or even thanks to, the efforts of 
Jesuit emblematics to enclose the curious modern subject within a guilt-ridden 
ontological and epistemological vacuum, nevertheless, the theoretical substan-
tiation of previously immaterial hypothetical truths charts an equivocal course 
Fig. 6. Sic Ex Instantibus, in Juan de Bora, Empresas morales (1681), 141
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toward the conflicting and multiple perspectives we associate with the more 
modern characteristics of the baroque. Once Clavius initiates his dialectical at-
tack on the doctrine of free will, the cut is made, and there is no way to neatly 
contain the forces of hypothetical world-making unleashed by the legitimation 
of syntactical play that comes at the expense of semantic rigor. Similarly, the 
syntactical possibilities of Borja’s circles, triangles, and lines cannot be com-
pletely contained by his allegorical program of spiritual guidance. This does 
not mean, however, that R. de la Flor is correct when he states that baroque 
aesthetics willingly moves to destroy the foundations of the monarchical-sei-
gniorial metaphysics of presence; rather, in modernity, no organicist frame-
work for meaning can avoid subverting its drive toward legitimacy, since the 
syntax on which it depends necessarily places its causal domain in contact with 
competing cosmologies. Its natural philosophy becomes one more expression 
of science fiction, a tiny speck in an infinite universe of other fictions.
Notes
1. Neal Stephenson, Anathem (511).
2. See R. de la Flor, La península metafísica.
3. Selig has compiled all of the references to Alciato’s Emblematum liber in the 
Agudeza in his study of Gracián.
4. All translations from Spanish to English are my own.
5. The spaceship’s form is that of an icosohedron (twenty sides), which is one of 
Plato’s five basic solid forms, and is associated with the element of water.
6. The aliens’ emblem turns out to be a representation of the Pythagorean theorem, 
which on Arbre is called the “Adrakhonian Theorem.” Stephenson includes the 
image in the text. It seems that Arbre’s Syntacticians base their thought on an ancient 
figure named Protas, who bears a striking resemblance to Plato: “Protas: A student 
of Thelenes during the Golden Age of Ethras, later the most important theor in 
Arbran history. Building on the foundation laid by Hylaea and later strengthened by 
the Orithenans, developed the notion that the object and ideas that humans perceive 
and think about are imperfect manifestations of pure, ideal forms that exist in 
another plane of existence” (Stephenson 905).
7. The title of Galileo’s treatise announcing his discovery of Jupiter’s four moons in 
1609 is Sidereus Nuncius (Starry Messenger).
8. For a baroque reading of Leibniz through the extended metaphor of the fold, see 
Deleuze.
9. See my The Persistence of Presence: Emblem and Ritual in Baroque Spain (2010).
10. “CAUSAL DOMAIN: A collection of things mutually linked in a web of cause-and-
effect relationships” (Stephenson, Anathem 893).
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11. Juan de Borja is the third son of (San) Francisco de Borja, Captain General of the 
Jesuit Order in sixteenth-century Spain (see García Mahíques).
12. The first critic to note the Spanish turn toward a more religiously informed and 
institutionally framed theory and practice of the emblem is Giuseppina Ledda, 
Contributto. For a more complete picture of the Spanish emblem book scene, see 
Pedro F. Campa, Emblemata Hispanica: An Annotated Bibliography of Spanish 
Emblem Literature to the Year 1700.
13. García Mahíques (37).
14. As far as education is concerned, the privileged place Holanda gives to mathematics 
and geometry anticipates Clavius’s reforms of the late 1500s: “Francisco de 
Holanda gives a privileged place to cosmography and astrology in the education of 
the painter. On par with geometry, mathematics and perspective, he recommends 
them . . . in order to reach the heavens in the hope of one day arriving to the 
Empyreum and realizing celestial works” (Deswarte 24).
15. Daly writes, “The impresa represents the ‘principle of individuation’ (Sulzer 35): it 
was used by one person only ‘as the expression of a personal aim’ (Schöne 45). The 
word itself comes from the Italian for ‘undertaking,’ which underlines the functional 
purpose of the impresa. The emblem, on the other hand, is addressed to a larger 
audience, its message is general, and it fulfills a didactic, decorative, or entertaining 
function, or any combination of these” (Literature 23). 
16. Although Borja’s collection was originally published in 1581, the more common 
edition to cite is the 1680 edition, due to its inclusion of a second century of 
emblems.
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